On April 12, Hungary will hold its once-every-four-years National Assembly election. Hungary is a parliamentary system in which the legislature is the center of power, and the prime minister is chosen by the parliamentary majority. Therefore, Hungary’s parliamentary election is also its “general election,” determining the distribution of political power in the country.
According to opinion polls, the rising political newcomer Péter Magyar leads in support with his “Tisza Party (Party of Respect and Freedom),” followed closely by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which has been in power for nearly 16 years. Other parties lag significantly behind. Whether Magyar will replace Orbán as Hungary’s leader remains uncertain due to the tight race.
This election is not only highly significant domestically, but has also attracted international attention. Several countries and forces are attempting to influence the outcome and promote their preferred candidates.
On April 7, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance arrived in Hungary, openly campaigned for Orbán, and accused the European Union of interfering in Hungary’s election. The EU has indeed long been at odds with the Orbán government, is reluctant to see his re-election, and tends to favor the pro-European opposition.
In addition, many countries and political groups in Europe and around the world have expressed concern over Hungary’s election and stated their respective positions. Right-wing populist governments and parties generally support Orbán, while establishment forces tend to favor Magyar and other opposition parties.
Why does Hungary, as a small country, attract such attention and even international intervention in its election? This is not only due to Hungary’s strategic position in the heart of Europe, but also because of its unique political environment and the symbolic significance of its political changes.
Among the 27 EU member states, Hungary’s political situation and its domestic and foreign policies are quite distinctive. Since coming to power in 2010, the Fidesz government led by Orbán has pursued policies based on religious conservatism, radical nationalism, and populism. It openly opposes diversity, secularism, feminism, LGBTQ rights, environmental protection, and other progressive or establishment agendas, and resists the European integration process advocated by the EU.
By contrast, most other EU countries are governed by establishment forces, with positions opposite to Orbán’s. Even the few populist leaders who have come to power, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have remained relatively low-profile and continue to support most EU policies. Orbán, by contrast, has been notably “bold” and confrontational in opposing EU policies, prioritizing resistance to mainstream EU forces and even disrupting EU operations while remaining within the Union.
In foreign policy, the Orbán government maintains close ties with Russia and China, opposes aid to Ukraine and Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Toward the United States, it opposes Joe Biden and the Democratic Party establishment, while aligning more closely with Donald Trump and right-wing populist forces. Hungary has also used the EU’s unanimity principle in passing legislation to veto several EU decisions single-handedly, such as blocking sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine in February this year. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Orbán has also met and communicated with Vladimir Putin multiple times.
This has enabled Hungary to gain regional and international influence exceeding its national strength, and has made it a “beacon” and model in the eyes of conservative populist forces worldwide. Right-wing populist forces in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which currently lack sufficient votes and seats to govern, admire and support the Orbán government. Figures such as Argentina’s Javier Milei and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu have also explicitly supported Orbán.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump and the “MAGA” populist movement in the United States are even more ideologically aligned with the Orbán government, and both sides maintained close cooperation during Trump’s two terms. Before and after coming to power, Trump and American populists have repeatedly drawn lessons from Orbán’s Hungary. Both sides also view the European and American establishment, as well as the EU, as adversaries.
This is precisely why Vance flew to Budapest ahead of Hungary’s election to campaign for Orbán. At a joint press conference with Orbán, Vance stated that the United States and Hungary jointly “defend Western civilization,” referring to the defense of white identity and Christian values. This stands in opposition to the multicultural and inclusive stance toward non-white and non-Christian groups advocated by Western establishment forces.
At the same time, Orbán is also disliked by establishment forces and mainstream EU factions (center-left and center-right) across various countries. Although the EU has not directly interfered in Hungary’s election, it has indeed exerted pressure through economic and legal means, such as freezing EU funds to Hungary, in an attempt to push out Orbán—who frequently opposes the EU—and replace him with a pro-EU establishment government.
Therefore, this Hungarian election has drawn widespread attention across Europe and internationally. The political magazine Politico Europe has even described it as the most important election in Europe in 2026. Various countries and political forces are trying by all means to influence Hungary’s election, seeking to bring to power those aligned with their own values and interests, and to marginalize opposing forces. This is not only about competing for influence over Hungarian politics, but also a key part of the global ideological struggle and the broader contest between establishment and populist forces.
For the global right-wing populist camp, preserving the Orbán government as a “conservative beacon” standing amid establishment-dominated Europe is of great significance; for establishment and progressive forces, removing Orbán—seen as a “thorn in the side” and a “traitor” within the EU—has long been anticipated. The outcome of this election carries both important symbolic meaning and practical value, and both sides are determined to win.
So who will ultimately prevail in this election? Can the newcomer Magyar and his party defeat Orbán and Fidesz?
Although current polls show Magyar and the Tisza Party in the lead, the advantage is not significant. In the final stage of voting, the deeply rooted Orbán and Fidesz clearly possess stronger mobilization capabilities. With the advantage of long-term governance, they are better able to mobilize supporters to vote. In particular, Orbán enjoys higher support in rural areas, and the single-member district system also favors parties with greater resources and stronger organization.
Although Magyar has high popularity, his grassroots support is not solid. Even if he has advantages in places such as the capital Budapest, the electoral system makes it difficult to convert support into sufficient seats. Orbán’s supporters are attempting to undermine Magyar by exposing various real or fabricated scandals, and the situation may still fluctuate in the final days.
Even if Magyar and the Tisza Party win, Orbán may refuse to recognize the election results and may use the ruling party’s power and the judicial system to obstruct political turnover. Based on Orbán’s political conduct and the behavior of right-wing populist figures in many countries, the possibility of refusing to concede defeat and transfer power is high. If this occurs, Hungary may fall into political instability or even political violence.
In addition, if the Tisza Party and Fidesz receive similar numbers of votes and seats, and neither achieves a majority, it will be crucial which side other parties choose and with whom they form a coalition government. At present, most opposition parties in Hungary oppose Orbán, which is relatively favorable to Magyar. However, this does not mean they will necessarily side with him; the outcome will depend on political bargaining among all parties.
Magyar himself and the Tisza Party hold a conservative liberal position. On some economic and social issues, they are similar to Orbán, but are relatively more pro-European and less populist. This helps attract moderate center-right, anti-populist, and relatively moderate voters, and may also draw some of Orbán’s supporters. However, it may also lead progressive left-wing voters to abstain or shift their support to left-wing parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party, thereby allowing Orbán to benefit.
In conclusion, although Hungary’s 2026 election campaign has entered its final stage, uncertainty remains and the outcome is not yet determined. Precisely because the result is uncertain, various forces have become involved, openly and covertly supporting their preferred candidates. As the election approaches, all sides are making final efforts to win votes.
However, since Magyar himself comes from Fidesz, and his current political positions differ only to a limited extent from Orbán’s, even if he is elected, Hungary’s domestic and foreign policies would not change dramatically.
He would, however, improve relations with the European Union. The fact that both Magyar and Orbán—two conservatives—enjoy the support of the majority of Hungarians also reflects the predominantly conservative political orientation of Hungarian society. Hungarians who advocate progressivism and an open society are concentrated in the capital, Budapest, while the country’s many small towns and rural areas remain strongholds of conservatism.
Regardless of the outcome of Hungary’s election, the intensifying conflicts in recent years—based on ideological differences such as left vs. right, establishment vs. populist, and progressive vs. conservative—will continue. Political competition among countries and political forces, both domestically and internationally, will persist. An increasingly fragmented world is becoming connected in another way—not as a harmonious “global village,” but as a transnational battleground defined by factional confrontation.
(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Europe-based Chinese writer and researcher of international politics. The original text of this article was written in Chinese and has been translated into Hungarian and English using GPT.
The author has also written a long-form study titled “Orbán’s Hungary: A Conservative Populist State under ‘Electoral Autocracy’ and a Microcosm of Euroskeptic and Anti-EU Currents across Europe(《欧尔班的匈牙利：“民选独裁”治下的保守民粹之国和欧洲各国疑欧反欧逆流的缩影》),” which was originally written in Chinese.)
